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SPEECHES

DISSECTING THE GUANTANAMO TRILOGY
DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN*

Ladies and gentlemen, I am very honored to join you here
today in Melbourne, Australia. You and your fellow countrymen
have been most hospitable to my wife Maura and me and we are
privileged to be your guests in your spectacularly beautiful country in this delightful corner of the world.
As you know from the introduction, I am a United States
Circuit Judge, having been nominated in 1986 to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by President Ronald Reagan, and confirmed by the United States Senate. My court, just one level
below the Supreme Court, is our largest regional circuit, encompassing the nine Western states, including California, Oregon,
Hawaii, and the Western Pacific Territories, and comprising
roughly twenty percent of the population of the country. And
while I will strive today to represent my circuit well, I must make
explicit that I speak only for myself as an individual American
judge and not for the court of which I am a member.
I.
I would like to speak with you today about three recent
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with military justice
and the extent of our Commander in Chiefs powers in times of
war. Today, one of the most important and inescapable challenges we all face is the very real threat of terrorism. Our respective countries have risen up in the face of such ignoble tactics,
declaring a War on Terror to protect our interests both at home
and abroad. And, of course, this War is indeed a different kind
of conflict; and it must be, for the threat it responds to is like
none we've before encountered. But because the pernicious
*
United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. This speech was delivered on August 30, 2004, to Monash University Post Law Graduates at the Australian Institute ofJudicial Administration
in Melbourne, Australia. I would like to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Robert D. Rees, my law clerk, in preparing these remarks.
317

318

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19

threat of terrorism is so very difficult to identify-much less to
defeat-the precious value of information and intelligence in
this struggle is difficult to deny.
Nevertheless, a fierce debate rages regarding the tactics used
to glean it. For, information is not costless. There is a price for
it, whether paid in terms of money, privacy, or even pressures on
our cherished civil liberties. Striking a balance between the value
and the cost of such information is inherently a political decision, and I mean that in the broadest possible sense: in democracies such as ours, the polity itself is the ultimate arbiter of this
conflict.
The way the people govern themselves in our systems, of
course, is through elected representatives. Of particular note in
this context is the President, the highest executive official, who is
generally responsible for matters of national defense in the
United States. In exercising such duties, the President's political
decisions about how to respond to terrorism-indeed, all of his
political decisions-are bound by law, both statutory and
constitutional.
Tasked with determining the precise extent of those preexisting boundaries is the judiciary; most notably our Supreme
Court. This Court must finally answer whether the President
exceeds his authority, either under a statute as enacted by the
Congress, or perhaps under the Constitution itself. Still, it is
hard to deny the wide-ranging political and social ramifications
these legal determinations can have.
II.
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent enemy combatant detention cases serve as excellent illustrations of these concepts.
A.
After agents of the al Qaeda terror network launched attacks
against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September
11, 2001, the United States Congress authorized the President
"to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . .or harbored such
organizations or persons."1 Pursuant to this statute, President
George W. Bush sent the United States Armed Forces into
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §2(a), 115
Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West 2003)).
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Afghanistan to confront al Qaeda operatives and the Taliban
regime that had supported them.
During the ensuing hostilities, American forces captured a
number of prisoners. Several hundred of them, including two
British citizens, two Australian citizens, and several Kuwaitis, were
subsequently transferred to the United States Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay on the Southeast Cuban coast. One of the men
captured in Afghanistan, however, was an American citizen
named Yasser Hamdi. Rather than being sent to Guantanamo,
he was transferred to a naval brig in South Carolina. And a final
person, Jose Padilla, also an American citizen, was not captured
abroad at all. Rather, he was suspected of conspiring to transport and to detonate a "dirty bomb" in America. Padilla was initially detained in a jail in New York, but was eventually
transferred to military custody in the same area where Hamdi was
held.
One thing, however, united all these people: the President
designated each of them an "enemy combatant," as a result of
which they would not be subject to certain Geneva Convention
protections available to those who can be classified as prisoners
of war. Inevitably, many disagreed with this decision, arguing not
only that the various detentions were poor political decisions, but
that they were illegal ones as well. As one might expect, the legal
challenges to the various detentions were subtle and multifaceted, and often entirely unrelated to questions regarding the
political wisdom of President Bush's decisions. With such arguments in hand, "next friends" or legal proxies, of some of the
prisoners brought their dispute to the courts. The particular
arguments and their resolutions by the Supreme Court differed
in each of these three cases, of course, so I'll briefly discuss each
of them in turn.
B.
The first case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,2 involved the American citizen who was captured at Chicago's O'Hare Airport upon arrival
of an airplane flight on suspicion of conspiring to obtain and to
detonate a so-called "dirty bomb."3 But as is often the case in the
law, there was a threshold issue: before deciding what process, if
any, Padilla may be due, and whether the President's actions
were supported by the Constitution and laws, the trial court first
2.
3.

124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
Id. at 2715.
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had to determine whether it possessed the jurisdictional power to
consider the case. 4
The precise vessel for such jurisdiction is known as the writ
of habeas corpus, a term well known to you, of course. Established in English common law several centuries before either of
our two countries were even founded, the "Great Writ" has historically served as the means by which a United States court
examines the legality of an executive detention. In practice, the
petitioner names his or her immediate custodian as the respondent.5 This is because the court, by granting the petition, formally orders that custodian to set the prisoner free.6 For
jurisdictional purposes, then, a prisoner seeking habeas relief
must file his or her petition
with the trial court that is in the same
7
district as the custodian.
The question in Padilla's case was who properly qualified as
his immediate custodian and, based on where that person was
located, which trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case.'
Padilla's habeas petition was filed in New York because his counsel thought that he was still being held there. But that turned
out not to be the case. Rather, two days before Padilla's attorney
filed the petition, the government transferred him to military
custody in a naval brig several hundred miles away-in an
entirely different judicial district than the one in which the
habeas petition had been filed.9 Nevertheless, the New York trial
court and, eventually, the federal appellate court, concluded that
even though Padilla's custodian was not actually located in their
district, he had sufficient contacts there to justify jurisdiction."0
The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and disagreed. 1
Such a theory, the Court noted, would undermine the rule that
strictly limits the jurisdiction in which a habeas petition must be
filed. For, there are often at least some contacts between a prisoner's custodian and any given judicial forum. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court dismissed the case. 2 Padilla should be able to
file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in another court-just
not in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 2715-16.
Id. at 2718.
Id. at 2717.
Id. at 2724.
Id. at 2717.
Id. at 2715-16.
Id. at 2716-17.
11. Id. at 2717, 2727.
12. Id. at 2727.
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York."3 In Padilla's case, then, the Court never even got past the
threshold issue it first had to confront.
C.
The next case, Rasul v. Bush, 4 involved the non-U.S. citizen
Guantanamo Bay detainees. Just as in Padilla,this case presented
a similar threshold question of whether the trial court possessed
habeas corpus jurisdiction over the case. 5 The very specific legal
issue was whether a United States court, this one sitting in Washington, D.C., had jurisdiction to consider the claims of foreign
nationals at a military base in Cuba.16
The district court, relying on Johnson v. Eisentrager,7 a U.S.
Supreme Court case involving German prisoners of war during
World War II, dismissed the action, holding that its habeas jurisdiction did not extend to foreign prisoners held on foreign soil,
even if their custodian was within the boundaries of the court's
judicial district.'" A federal appeals court-a sister court to my
own-agreed.19
The Supreme Court granted review, and began its analysis
by examining the Guantanamo Bay lease agreement between the
United States and Cuba. While the lease explicitly does not
establish "ultimate sovereignty" over the lands it specifies, it does
provide that the United States exercises "complete jurisdiction
and control" over them.2" Given such dominion over the specified land, the Court determined that the military base was sufficiently within the "territorial jurisdiction" of the United States. 2
And because the trial court and the prisoners' custodians were
each located in the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court
held that the habeas corpus statute conferred jurisdiction over
the case.
Unlike Mr. Padilla, Mr. Rasul and his fellow petitioners were
able to clear the initial jurisdictional hurdle in their case. The
Supreme Court, however, was not: because the lower courts dismissed the case, those courts never had a chance to consider the
myriad of other claims presented in the habeas corpus petitions.
13. Id.
14. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
15. Id. at 2690.
16. Id.
17. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
18. Rasu4 124 S. Ct. at 2691.
19. Id.
20. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418.
21. Rasu; 124 S. Ct. at 2696.
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As a result, the Supreme Court simply sent those remaining
issues 2 back
to be determined in the first instance by the trial
2
court.

D.
The final case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,2 is the only one in which
the Supreme Court actually got beyond a threshold issuealthough not by much. First, there were no jurisdictional
problems with Hamdi's habeas corpus petition: both he and his
immediate custodian were clearly located in the United States
and within the judicial district where the petition was filed.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court was able to address some of the
meatier issues involved. 4
Yet Hamdi is nevertheless a complicated case, particularly
because no one Justice's view was able to command a majority of
the Court. So while there are roughly fifty pages worth of legal
opinions, none of them can be characterized as the clear law of
the land. The closest we have is a plurality opinion, joined by
four of the nine Justices.2 5
Still, a majority of the Justices were able to find common
ground on some points. For example, at least five of them
agreed that the President had the statutory authority to have
Hamdi detained by the military in the first place. 6 Further, and
perhaps most importantly, nearly all of the Justices agreed that
Hamdi deserved some kind of process through which he could
challenge his7 designation as an enemy combatant before a neutral arbiter.
But because of the fractured nature of the Court's opinions,
it is not at all clear exactly what kind, or what amount of process
would satisfy such a requirement. Some, such as Justices Scalia
and Stevens, suggested that nothing short of a full criminal trial
in a court of law would do based on Hamdi's status as a U.S.
citizen.2 8 Others, including the plurality, indicated that the full
due process protections of a trial in the United States courts may
not be necessary. 29 The Supreme Court ultimately remanded
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 2699.
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
Id. at 2636.

25.

Id. at 2634-35.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at

2639-40, 2653, 2679.
2650, 2670-71, 2685.
2670-71.
2650-51, 2685.
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the case back to the lower courts, saving further consideration
for another day. 30
III.
The Supreme Court announced these rather limited dispositions in all three cases, Padilla, Rasul, and Hamdi, on June 28th,
2004." It immediately sparked a media frenzy, prompting
screaming headlines around the world. Almost all of them
emphasized the perceived political repercussions of the Court's
decisions, such as, "Court Deals Blow to Bush on Combatants"; 2
and, in one of the more inflammatory examples, "Court Defies
White House with Ruling on Prisoners."3 3 Indeed, as might be
expected, some reports were overfly partisan: compare "Supreme
Decisions on War on Terrorism" 4 with
Court Issues 'Troubling'
35
Victory."
"Due Process
But despite all the hoopla, I feel confident in presuming
that the great public appetite for the case was not premised upon
an interest either in the proper physical location in which to file
a writ of habeas corpus or in the interpretation of a century-old
real estate lease. Rather, I believe it is fair to conclude that the
fervor arose because of the perceived political impact the cases
necessarily had. Although the Supreme Court generally decided
upon narrow and rather technical legal issues, and reserved several specific issues for another day, the effect of the decisions was
to provide some support for those who refuted one of the President's political responses to the War on Terror.
And perhaps the Supreme Court did "refute" the President-but only in the most oblique sense of the word. The President's legal position was that the courts lacked jurisdiction over
30. Id. at 2652.
31. Padilla,124 S. Ct. at 2711; Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2686; Hamdi, 124 S. Ct.
at 2633.
32. Court Deals Blow to Bush on Combatants, ABC NEws, June 28, 2004, at
http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/Politics/ap20040629-11 .html?CMP=OTCRSSFeeds0312.
33.

Court Defies White House with Ruling on Prisoners, THE INDEPENDENT

(London), June 29, 2004, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/
americas/story.jsp?story=536303 (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy).
34. Am. Ctr. for Law and Justice, Supreme Court Issues "Troubling"Decisions
on War on Terrorism (June 28, 2004), at http://www.aclj.org/News/Read.aspx?
ID=177 (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
35. Due Process Victory, THE MONITOR (McAllen, Tex.),July 1, 2004, available at http://www.themonitor.com/SiteProcessor.cfm?Template=/GlobalTemplates/Details.cfm&StorylD=2529&Section=Opinion (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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any of these prisoners, and the Supreme Court did disagree on
that point, foreclosing the prospect that the U.S. courts simply
had nothing whatsoever to do with the cases. Additionally, the
Court did assert, over the objections of the administration, that
Hamdi, at least, deserved some amount of process before a neutral arbiter to challenge his detention.3 6
But to identify a "winner" or a "loser" is far too simplistic in
my view. For the Supreme Court-indeed all courts-make pronouncements of law, not politics. Indeed, despite the cases' disagreements with the President's position on certain grounds, the
Court simultaneously reaffirmed several of his other legal propositions. For example, the Court accepted that the United
States is pursuing a legally authorized armed conflict with al
Qaeda and the Taliban. It also recognized that both United
States and non-United States citizens can be "enemy combatants," and that the President can capture and hold them indefinitely, without trial, during the pendency of a given conflict.
What is perhaps most clear from the decisions is that the courts
will have some continuing, though perhaps limited role in
reviewing such cases.
But beyond that, a great deal remains to be settled, both as a
legal and as a political matter. Indeed, such additional considerations are already beginning. In the aftermath of these three
detention decisions, the President began establishing military
tribunals to consider some of the claims of the Guantanamo
detainees. The Secretary of the Navy has already announced
fourteen decisions among the thirty-one Detainees Combatant
Status Review Boards convened since June 28, 2004. All fourteen
upheld the enemy combatant designation after hearings before
panels of military officers. Annual review tribunals are also
planned. Additionally, several trial courts-now exercising their
newly affirmed habeas corpus jurisdiction-are beginning to
consider the substantive question of just how much process the
detainees must receive and whether it may differ between those
captured abroad and those seized within the United States, and
between those who are American citizens and those who are not.
Of course, these are distinct from the military commission of five
officers that will try David Hicks and three others on specific
charges.
There is a fair chance that these and other legal questions
will wind their way through our entire legal system once again,
facing further review in the Supreme Court. And as we have
seen, even the most obscure legal determinations the Court may
36.

Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650, 2670-71, 2685.
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be faced with-such as the niceties of a hundred-year-old leasecan implicate some of the most delicate political choices a free
society must make in dangerous times. For this reason, I expect
that the full attention of our country-if not the world-will
focus with profound intensity on our courts as we continue working through these difficult and important issues regarding military justice.
I thank you for your kind and generous attention and welcome any questions you may have.

